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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1, 1997 through
September 30, 1998. The cases examined include decisions of
courts of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
II. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Concord Oil Company v. Pennzoil Exploration and Petroleum Com-
pany2 is a recent troublesome "two-grant" deed case which again divides
the court as it struggles to deal with this difficult line of cases.3 In a 1937
deed, the grantor, who owned a 1/12th mineral interest in land subject to
a producing oil and gas lease, conveyed to grantee:
[a]n undivided one-ninety sixth (1/96) interest in and to all of the oil,
gas and other minerals in and under, and that may be produced
from ... [the land]... together with all rights ... necessary... to the
full use and enjoyment of such estate herein conveyed .... While
the estate hereby conveyed does not depend upon the validity
thereof, neither shall it be affected by the termination thereof, this
conveyance is made subject to the terms of any valid subsisting oil,
gas and/or mineral lease or mineral lease or leases on above de-
scribed land or any part thereof, but covers and includes one-twelfth
(1/12) of all rentals and royalty of every kind and character that may
be payable by the terms of such lease or leases insofar as the same
* B.A., Rice University, J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included in this Survey.
2. 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).
3. See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991); Luckel v. White, 819
S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991); Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957); Tipps v.
Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, writ ref'd).
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pertain to the above described land, or any part thereof.4
The 1937 deed did not contain an express future lease clause.
In a 1961 warranty deed, the same grantor purported to convey a 7/96
mineral interest that was eventually acquired by Pennzoil. Concord, as
successor to the grantee in the 1937 deed, filed suit against Pennzoil as-
serting that the 1937 deed conveyed all of the grantor's 1/12 mineral in-
terest in the land.5 A holding that the 1937 deed conveyed all of the 1/12
mineral interest, rather than the 1/96 mineral interest specified in the
granting clause, would wipe out all of Pennzoil's interest derived from the
1961 deed.
The majority opinion (Justices Owen, Phillips, Hecht and Abbott) re-
versed the judgment for Pennzoil and rendered judgment for Concord. 6
The court heavily emphasized the "four corners" rule and the harmoniz-
ing canon of construction in construing the parties' intention from the
conveyance "in its entirety."' 7 The court read its recent decision in Luckel
v. White8 as identifying "a unifying principle: the entire document must
be examined to glean the parties' intent."' Moreover, the "conveyance
must be considered as a whole to determine the intent of the parties and
that seemingly conflicting provisions are to be harmonized if possible." 10
Nevertheless, the majority opinion seems to be focused on the refer-
ence to a single "estate" in the granting clause of the 1937 deed in con-
cluding that the grant conveyed a single, simultaneous 1/12 unified
mineral interest subject to the existing lease, which included 1/12 of royal-
ties and delay rentals under both existing and future leases, and a 1/12
interest in the possibility of reverter in the minerals." The court con-
cluded that the grantor's intent was to convey a single estate, and that it
need only determine the size and character of that single estate.12 Be-
cause the intent was to convey a single estate, the court concluded that
the quantum of interest conveyed was the greater interest-1/12 instead
of 1/96.13 Finally, the court concluded that the nature of the interest con-
veyed was a mineral interest rather than a royalty interest because the
granting clause contained all of the classic language used in granting an
interest in minerals.' 4
Once again the court refused to adopt a "bright-line" rule of construc-
tion for construing mineral and royalty conveyances that contain differing
fractions. The principles adopted by the court are intended to give effect
4. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 463.
7. See id. at 454.
8. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
9. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 454 (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462).
10. Id. at 457.
11. See id. at 457-58.
12. See id. at 458.
13. See id. at 459.
14. See id. (Mineral interest rights include rights to possess, drill, lay pipeline, build
tanks, etc.)
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to the intent of the parties as actually expressed within the four corners of
the conveyance and to "harmonize" provisions that appear to conflict. 15
This is little comfort to the title examiner who must somehow translate
the cacophony of poorly drafted deeds and discordant judicial opinions
into "harmony," while poring over some dusty deed records in the corner
of the County Clerk's office. The dissent stated: "The Court's opinion
promotes ad-hoc analysis of every mineral deed and wreaks havoc on title
stability." '16
Justice Enoch provided the swing vote. He agreed with the plurality
that the deed could not reasonably be interpreted as conveying two es-
tates. 17 In his opinion, however, the majority relied on an improper pre-
supposition that grantors typically intend to convey only one estate and
that the subsequent clause in this deed includes future leases."' The dis-
sent would be correct in construing the deed as a two-grant deed, except
that in his view, had the granting clause and the subsequent clause each
conveyed separate "estates," an overconveyance and an unavoidable con-
flict would result. If there were two grants, then 9/96 would be conveyed
under the then-current lease. 19 Construing the deed as a non-simultane-
ous grant would be unreasonable and contrary to the language of both
clauses.20
The dissenting opinion (Justices Gonzales, Spector, Baker and Hankin-
son) would hold that the deed unambiguously conveys two estates of dif-
ferent sizes and durations: 1/96th interest in the mineral fee and a 1/12
interest in rentals and royalties that terminated when the existing lease
terminated.21 There is no overconveyance because the 1/12 interest is in
royalty from an existing lease and the 1/96 interest is in the possibility of
reverter. The right to royalty from subsisting leases and the possibility of
reverter are separate interests which should not be added together.22
There is no irreconcilable conflict just because two fractions appear in the
deed. The dissent contends that its construction avoids the assumption
made by the majority that the grantor meant to convey 1/12 when grantor
wrote 1/96.23
In a case of first impression, Ely v. Briley24 holds that a constructively
severed riparian mineral interest is subject to the doctrine of accretion. 25
Accretion is the result of a river gradually changing its course over time
so that a tract described as bounded by the river increases in size. Texas
recognizes the doctrine of accretion under which the owner of riparian
15. Id. at 461.
16. Id. at 467.
17. See id. at 463.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 464.
20. See id. at 465.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 467.
23. See id.
24. 959 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
25. See id. at 726.
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land gains title to land that accretes to his property. 26 In this case the
tract of land had been described since 1879 as having one boundary going
to the Brazos river and up the river with its meanders. In a 1947 deed,
grantor reserved "an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to all of the
oil, gas and other mineral [sic] in and under the herein described prop-
erty."'27 After 1947, the conveyed tract increased in size by approxi-
mately 266 acres by accretion.28
Successors to the grantee claimed that under the deed of severance the
grantee was entitled to all royalties from the 266 acres added by accretion
because (1) a severed riparian mineral interest was not subject to accre-
tion, or alternatively, and (2) the deed of severance limited grantor's re-
served mineral interest to the boundaries as they existed in 1947 by the
language used in the deed ("in and under the herein described prop-
erty"). 29 The court noted that under Texas law, a mineral interest is a
property interest regardless of whether or not the mineral estate is sev-
ered from the surface estate. Holding that severed minerals are subject
to the law of accretion the same as the surface estate is supported by the
practical consideration that the location of original mineral boundaries is
often undeterminable. 30 The holding follows other jurisdictions that have
considered the issue.31
This holding applies regardless of the language in the reservation in the
1947 deed, which used the words "in and under the herein described
property." Those words were used as words of description and not of
limitation.32 An unqualified reservation of the mineral estate reserves
the entire bundle of property rights which comprise the mineral estate,
such as the rights to lease and to receive bonus, rentals and royalties.33
The 1947 deed reserved all rights to the mineral estate; the right to in-
crease by accretion is part of the bundle of riparian property rights, and
therefore an unqualified reservation of the riparian mineral estate
reserves the right to future accretion. 34
Lee M. Bass, Inc. v. Shell Western E & P, Inc.35 reviews a lease clause
that provided lessee would reimburse lessor for "all production, sever-
ance, gathering, sales, excise and similar taxes imposed upon or assessed
with respect to or measured by or charged against the production or
value of production or proceeds of the sale of production attributable to
Lessor's royalty interest. ' 36 The lessor contended that the lessee should
26. See id.
27. Id. at 725.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 725-26.
30. See id. at 726.
31. See, e.g., Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1980); Jackson v. Burling-
ton Northern, Inc., 667 P.2d 406 (Mont. 1983).
32. See Ely, 959 S.W.2d at 727.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. 957 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
36. Id. at 160.
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reimburse the lessor for ad valorem taxes assessed against the royalty
interest.
The court held that reimbursement was not required because ad
valorem taxes existed at the time the lease was executed, and if the par-
ties intended to include ad valorem taxes then ad valorem taxes should
have been listed.37 Moreover, the court reasoned that ad valorem taxes
are not "similar taxes" within the meaning of the lease. The "value of
production" refers to oil and gas that has actually been severed from the
ground. Ad valorem taxes are assessed against minerals still in the
ground, not on production.38
It is unusual for language such as this to be in an oil and gas lease, so
that the decision is not likely to affect many leases. However, it is quite
common for conveyances of overriding royalty to expressly place the bur-
den of paying certain taxes on either the owner of the overriding royalty
or on the owner of the working interest. The significance of this case may
be more important in its effect on the construction of the language creat-
ing various overriding royalty interests in which there is a list of taxes
followed by a dragnet clause, such as "and other similar taxes assessed
against the value of production."
Riley v. Riley39 reviews homestead rights in oil and gas production and
the applicability of the open mine doctrine. At the time Elbert and Bob-
bie Riley were married, Elbert Riley owned as separate property the
Home Place (160 acres) and the River Place (74.7 acres). The Rileys
lived on the Home Place throughout their marriage, and the widow Bob-
bie continued to live there after Elbert's death. The Rileys farmed and
ranched all of the property during their marriage for part of their support.
There was also oil and gas production from the River Place.40
Bobbie Riley was rightfully entitled to claim 200 acres as her home-
stead because during their marriage Elbert and Bobbie were entitled to
claim a rural homestead of 200 acres on Elbert Riley's separate property.
The surviving spouse has the same homestead right in the property as
both spouses had prior to the death of one spouse.41
Bobbie Riley claimed a homestead in 140 acres of the Home Place and
59.7 acres of the River Place, including the production of oil and gas. The
first issue considered was whether Bobbie Riley could designate less than
all of the Home Place so that she could also designate 59.7 mineral-rich
acres in the River Place. The designation was upheld because a home-
stead designation may exclude part of a tract actually occupied to obtain
acreage in another tract when the evidence shows that the properties
were used in such a manner as to establish homestead rights in the
properties.42
37. See id. at 161.
38. See id. at 162 & n.4.
39. 972 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet. h.).
40. See id. at 151.




The parties also contested the right to royalties from the date of
Elbert's death until the conveyance of the properties out of the estate.
Under the open mine doctrine, a homestead claimant is entitled to re-
ceive and expend all royalties from the homestead, when the homestead
was producing oil or gas when the right in the property came into exist-
ence.43 Because the 59.7 acres in the River Place were producing and
included in the homestead designation, Bobbie Riley was held entitled to
those royalties. 44 As to the other 15 acres in the River Place, the case was
remanded because the record was not fully developed.4 5
III. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
Horizon Resources, Inc. v. Putnam46 determined whether an overriding
royalty payable to the lessor and included in an attached addendum to a
printed lease form is subject to the proportionate reduction clause found
in the printed lease form. The printed lease form included a typical roy-
alty clause, and it also included a proportionate reduction clause which
provided:
[I]t is agreed that if this lease covers a less interest in the oil, gas,
sulphur, or other minerals in all or any part of said land than the
entire and undivided fee simple estate ... then the royalties, delay
rental and other monies accruing from any part as to which this lease
covers less than such full interest, shall be paid only in the proportion
which the interest therein, if any, covered by this lease, bears to the
whole and undivided fee simple estate therein.47
The clause adding an overriding royalty in the addendum provided:
"As additional bonus for the making of this lease, LESSOR shall receive
an overriding two-thirty fifths (2/35) royalty in all oil, gas, liquid hydro-
carbon and sulphur associated with their production, produced from
these leased premises. ''48
A portion of the leased premises in which the lessor owned a 50% in-
terest was pooled into a producing unit. Lessor signed division orders in
which the overriding royalty was proportionately reduced, and lessor ac-
cepted reduced payments for more than two years. Lessor then filed suit
to recover the underpaid overriding royalty, and lessor and lessee filed
cross motions for summary judgment.49
The court held that the overriding royalty was subject to proportionate
reduction and relied heavily upon McMahon v. Christmann50 and New-
port Oil Co. v. Lamb,51 which were based on similar facts. In McMahon,
43. See id. at 155.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 156.
46. 976 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
47. Id. at 269.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 270.
50. 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957).
51. 352 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1962, no writ).
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the overriding royalty was held to be free from reduction, primarily be-
cause the language in the addendum creating the overriding royalty re-
cited that it was to be "without reduction. ' 52 In Newport, there was no
similar "without reduction" language in the addendum, and the court
held that, absent express language to the contrary, the proportionate re-
duction clause, although found in the printed portion of the lease, was
applicable to the overriding royalty provision.53 The opinion in the Put-
nam case ignores the division orders in reaching its decision.
Houston Endowment Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.54 is a discovery rule
case. Texaco, Arco and others were lessees under various leases unitized
into a gas unit. Production from the gas unit was run through a gas plant
that was owned by the lessees and operated by Texaco. Each lessee paid
royalties to the royalty owners separately, pursuant to separate leases and
division orders. 55 In 1977, Texaco reduced the percentage of royalties it
paid on the processed natural gas liquids from 100% to 85% in order to
defray the costs of building a new plant. All of the other lessees followed
suit, but the lessees continued to deduct severance taxes from the royalty
owners based on 100% of the value of the natural gas liquids. In 1986,
Arco sold all of its interests. The lawsuit is focused on plaintiff royalty
owners' claims against Arco for underpayment of royalties from 1977 to
1986.56
The royalty owners sued Texaco and others in 1990. In 1993, during the
course of discovery, the royalty owners claimed they first learned of the
working interest owners' agreement to withhold royalties and that Arco
was a party to the alleged scheme. 57 Arco relied upon limitations for its
defense, and plaintiff royalty owners contended that limitations was
tolled by the discovery rule or by fraudulent concealment. Arco pre-
vailed because the facts established that the royalty owners knew or
should have known of the underpayment more than four years before
they took action on their claim, and their knowledge defeated any claim
that they reasonably relied upon fraudulent concealment. 58
Arco prevailed in this case on unusually favorable facts. However, the
significance of the case is that the Court found that underpayments of
royalty are generally undiscoverable and are subject to the discovery rule
under the usual facts and circumstances. The Court applied the test ar-
ticulated in Computer Association International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.59 to de-
termine whether the discovery rule was applicable. Because it was
undisputed that the royalty owners alleged injuries were objectively veri-
fiable, the inquiry was focused on whether the injury was "inherently un-
52. McMahon, 303 S.W.2d at 343.
53. See Putnam, 976 S.W.2d at 271.
54. 972 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Houston [14"h Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
55. See id. at 158.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 162-63.
59. 918 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1996).
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discoverable. ' 60 The Court found that the royalty owners did not receive
a detailed accounting showing the basis for the calculation of royalties,
and that the amount of the royalties could not be calculated from the
information Arco supplied in its monthly statements. 6' The significant
holding of the case is:
Arco's underpayment of royalties was not information about which
the royalty owners, using due diligence, would ordinarily learn; they
would not learn this information unless it was supplied by a working
interest owner. Thus, the injury was inherently undiscoverable. As
such, the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitation until the [roy-
alty owners] subjectively knew or should have known of the
underpayment. 62
This holding suggests that there may be many underpayment cases in
which the recovery period could cover many, many years.
Shivers v. Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc.63 is another discov-
ery rule case. Under 26 U.S.C.A. § 29(a) and (c), the tax code grants a
"Section 29 Tight Sands" tax credit. Shivers was a royalty owner in a
property eligible for the tax credit. When Shivers actually became aware
of his eligibility, he filed amended returns for prior years for the three
prior years permitted by the tax code. He then sued Texaco for damages
attributable to all of the prior years for which he could not file amended
tax returns. 6
4
Texaco prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, which was
urged on multiple grounds in the trial court.65 On appeal, the Court up-
held the summary judgment on limitations and did not rule on Texaco's
fundamental challenge of no duty.66 The principal issue was thus whether
Shivers' injury was "inherently undiscoverable. ' 67 To compute and claim
the Section 29 tax credit, a royalty owner must know:
(1) that the well produced gas from a "tight formation" as deter-
mined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC);
(2) that the well had been certified as a "tight formation" by the
Texas Railroad Commission (TRC);
(3) that the leasehold was dedicated or committed to interstate com-
merce on or before April 20, 1977; and
(4) the average annual B.T.U. of the gas for the tax year.68
In concluding that the Shivers claim was not inherently undiscoverable
and that a diligent lessor would have filed suit within the statute of limita-
tions, the court relied very heavily upon the presumption that taxpayers
are charged with knowledge of the tax code and that publications in the
60. Houston Endowment, 972 S.W.2d at 159.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 160.
63. 965 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
64. See id. at 730.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 733-34.
67. See id. at 734.
68. Id. at 735.
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Federal Register and in the public records of the TRC amount to con-
structive notice. 69
IV. OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Holloway v. Atlantic Richfield Co.70 reviews the duties owed by an op-
erator to a nonoperator when the operator undertakes to market the no-
noperator's gas. The operator entered into a series of favorable gas
purchase contracts that were breached by the gas purchaser when oil and
gas prices dropped. The settlement of the ensuing take-or-pay litigation
resulted in amendments to the gas purchase contracts for greater takes
but lower prices. The operator marketed the nonoperator's gas under the
amended contracts for a short period of time, and then the operator com-
pletely stopped marketing the nonoperator's gas.71
The applicable operating agreements had typical language providing
that the nonoperator had the right to take in-kind or separately dispose
of his oil and gas, and that the operator had the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to purchase the oil and gas of the nonoperator if the nonoperator
did not take or sell it himself. The operator was obligated to sell the oil
and gas, if it did undertake to sell it "at the best price obtainable in the
area of such production. ' '72
The nonoperator contended that the operator breached its fiduciary
duty and breached its contractual duty by amending the gas purchase
contracts and by failing to market the gas at the best price obtainable.
The nonoperator sought to avoid summary judgment on the fiduciary
duty claim by relying upon Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc.,73 which
had held that "the scope of [the operator's] duties to [nonoperators] is an
undetermined fact issue that precludes summary judgment .... ,,74 John-
ston was distinguished in Holloway because in Holloway it was undis-
puted that the nonoperator's gas was not dedicated.75 Therefore, the
operator owed the nonoperator only the limited duty to account for the
monies received for selling his gas, to avoid conflicts of interests, and not
to act as an adverse party in its capacity as the seller of the gas.76 The
court also relied upon the related litigation in Atlantic Richfield Company
v. Long Trusts.77
The breach of contract claim that the operator had not obtained "the
best price obtainable in the area" was based on the contention that the
original gas purchase contracts were the best price obtainable. As a mat-
ter of law, when the nonoperator reserves the right to take the production
69. See id.
70. 970 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.).
71. See id. at 642.
72. Id.
73. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. - Austin 1992, writ denied).
74. Id. at 716.
75. See Holloway, 970 S.W.2d at 643.
76. See id.
77. 860 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
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of the well in-kind, the production of the nonoperator is not dedicated. If
the gas is not dedicated, the nonoperator cannot contend that the opera-
tor is obligated to the nonoperator under the operator's original gas
purchase contract.78
The operator offered proof of fair market value for undedicated gas,
but market price and best price obtainable are not synonymous terms.
Because it is possible that by the exercise of reasonable effort the opera-
tor might obtain more favorable terms than market price, the summary
judgment on this point was not proper.79
Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson ° upholds an order certifying a class action
brought to enforce an alleged private cause of action arising under
Rule 34 of the Statewide Conservation Rules of the Texas Railroad Com-
mission (known as the Market Demand Rule). The Market Demand
Rule states: "A first purchaser shall not discriminate between different
wells from which it purchases in the same field, nor shall it discriminate
unjustly or unreasonably between separate fields." 8' Plaintiffs alleged
that Intratex did not purchase gas ratably from the wells of more than 900
producers by selectively producing increases in demand from wells that
had a weighted average cost below the current spot market price and by
increasing takes from certain wells immediately after exercising a down-
ward price redetermination on those wells. 82 The class was defined as
"[a]ll persons who were producers of natural gas sold to the defendant
between January 1, 1978 and December 31, 1988 whose natural gas was
taken by the defendant in quantities less than their ratable
proportions. "83
Intratex contended that the definition of the class required an im-
proper conclusion on the merits of plaintiffs' claims. Although trial
courts enjoy a wide range of discretion in determining whether to main-
tain a lawsuit as a class action, the trial court may not consider the sub-
stantive merits of the class claims in making such a determination.84 In
upholding the certification, the court held that it is the act of not taking
ratably, and not the reasons for the undertaking or whether there is proof
of a compensable injury, that defines the class by reference to the objec-
tive conduct of Intratex. 85 The dissent would reverse because the defini-
tion requires a finding of wrongdoing in order to constitute the class. The
concept of ratability, as used by the plaintiffs, subsumes the notion of
discrimination, so that the unlawful conduct is predetermined. 86 How-
ever, the majority was apparently persuaded that the class was objectively
78. See Holloway 970 S.W.2d at 644.
79. See id.
80. 960 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Houston [1" Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
81. Id. at 400.
82. See id. at 396.
83. Id. at 394.
84. See id. at 393.
85. See id. at 394-95.
86. See id. at 399-400.
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defined in relation to Intratex's act of not taking, and it was undisputed
that the identity of the producers could be obtained from Intratex's own
records and from the Texas Railroad Commission records, so that the
class could always later be decertified or the class definition modified. 87
Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett88 is another discovery rule case, and it
reviews the application of the rule to various causes of action based on
hydrogen sulfide pollution. Mitchell allegedly failed to properly maintain
its gas wells, causing hydrogen sulfide to migrate from the gas wells into
the Trinity Acquifer, the source of the land owners' water supply. Hydro-
gen sulfide is associated with a "rotten egg" odor. Mitchell had drilled
approximately 3,700 gas wells in Wise County and in surrounding coun-
ties since the 1950's, and at the time of trial operated approximately 2,000
active wells in the area. The Bartletts and many other land owners sued
Mitchell and alleged that various deficiencies in Mitchell's maintenance
made Mitchell liable on theories of nuisance, negligence, trespass, viola-
tion of various regulatory rules, and fraud.89 The jury found for the land
owners on all of their claims and awarded compensatory damages for
mental anguish; physical pain; discomfort, annoyance and inconvenience;
out-of-pocket expenses; property damage; and diminished value of real
estate. The jury also found that Mitchell's conduct constituted gross neg-
ligence and was committed with malice. The jury awarded the land own-
ers punitive damages of $200,000,000.90
The judgment was reversed and rendered because almost all of the land
owners' claims were found to be barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions. Claims for personal injury and property damage are governed by
the two-year statute and must be brought within two years from the date
of "accrual" of the cause of action.91 Generally, a cause of action accrues
when a wrongful act causes an injury, regardless of when the plaintiff
learns of the injury.92 However, Texas courts have applied the discovery
rule of accrual to causes of action for damage to property.93 When ap-
plied, this rule operates to toll the running of the limitations period until
the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable care and dili-
gence should have discovered, the fact of injury.94 Regarding claims for
permanent injury to property, the action accrues and the statute begins to
run when the injury is first discovered or should have been discovered. 95
Therefore, in this case, the proper inquiry was: "Did [land owners] file
their lawsuits within two years of the date they discovered, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact of their
87. See id. at 395.
88. 958 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied).
89. See id. at 434-35.
90. See id. at 435.
91. See id.







The evidence conclusively established that the land owners knew that
their water tasted bad and smelled bad for many years before they sued,
and therefore, their claims were barred. Because there were a few land
owners who did timely file their suit, the court went on to consider
whether there was any evidence of causation. The court then effectively
threw out the land owners' expert testimony because of defects in the
underlying facts and methodology.
V. REGULATORY ISSUES
In re H.L.S. Energy Co., Inc.97 holds that post-petition expenses for the
remediation of post-petition environmental liabilities constitute an ad-
ministrative expense entitled to priority in bankruptcy over the claims of
other secured creditors. 98 The debtor was the sole owner of the operating
interests in wells that ceased producing, and the estate's obligation to
plug the wells under state law arose post-petition. 99 The Chapter 11
Trustee negotiated an agreement with the State of Texas in which the
state waived substantial penalties, plugged the wells and charged the cost
of plugging to the estate. 100
The trustee contested the state's priority status, contending that the
plugging did not benefit the estate.101 Under federal law, bankruptcy
trustees must comply with state law and may not abandon property in
contravention of a state law reasonably designed to protect public health
or safety. 10 2 The court expressly did not reach the question of whether
post-petition expenses for the remediation of pre-petition environmental
liabilities would likewise constitute an administrative expense."' 3 The de-
cision is significant to the state's continuing efforts to enforce plugging
obligations because the failure to plug is frequently attributable to busi-
ness failure.
Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. F.E.R.C."'4 vacates and remands an order of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission which had denied Sea
Robin's petition for a declaration that Sea Robin's facilities perform a
"gathering" function, rather than a "transportation" function. 0 5 Section
l(b) of the Natural Gas Act' 0 6 governs "the transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce. 1 07 This section expressly exempts from the
Commission's jurisdiction the production or gathering of gas. Thus, the
96. Id. at 437.
97. 151 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 1998).
98. See id. at 436.
99. See id. at 439.
100. See id. at 436.
101. See id. at 438.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 439.
104. 127 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1997).
105. See id at 367.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 717, et seq. (1998).
107. Id. at § 717(b).
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characterization of a pipeline system as a "gathering" or "transportation"
system determines whether it will be subject to Commission
jurisdiction.108
The pipeline system in issue was a very large offshore system with ma-
jor facilities onshore for separating, dehydrating, processing and com-
pressing the gas.10 9 The Commission emphasized non-physical criteria in
reaching its decision. Specifically, the Commission gave great weight to
the system's prior certification as a jurisdictional pipeline, ownership by
an interstate pipeline and that granting gathering status to Sea Robin
would amount to the deregulation of the entire natural gas pipeline sys-
tem on the outer continental shelf. The Court concluded that the "Com-
mission's accent on business purpose, ownership, and prior certification
status misses the basic thrust of the primary function test-making a tech-
nical distinction between gathering and transportation based on the phys-
ical and operational characteristics of a pipeline facility." 110 By enacting
the regulatory scheme encompassed in the Natural Gas Act, Congress
defined the jurisdictional reach of the Commission by the distinctions be-
tween gathering and transporting. 1
State v. Triax Oil and Gas, Inc.112 holds corporate officers individually
liable for their company's failure to properly plug and abandon wells.11 3
The Railroad Commission sent notice of a hearing to Triax in December
1992. A hearing was held in January 1993 at which Triax failed to appear.
The corporate charter of Triax was forfeited for failure to file a franchise
tax report in February 1993. The Commission eventually imposed admin-
istrative penalties and incurred costs by expending state funds to plug
Triax wells. In September 1995, the state sued to enforce the administra-
tive penalties, to recover plugging costs and for additional civil penalties
for failure to abide by the order, court costs and attorney's fees.114 The
state also sued under the Tax Code to hold the directors individually lia-
ble for all liabilities of Triax due to the forfeiture of the corporate
charter.115
The trial court apparently believed that the proceeding before the
Commission imposing the administrative penalties was not final because
the directors allegedly never received notice that the motion for rehear-
ing was overruled.116 The court held that the motion for rehearing was
overruled by operation of law, regardless of whether the directors did or
did not receive notice. Therefore, the Commission order was final, it was
not appealed by judicial review, and to attack that decision in this pro-
108. See Sea Robin Pipeline, 127 F.3d at 368.
109. See. id. at 367.
110. Id. at 370.
111. See id. at 371.
112. 966 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
113. See id. at 128.
114. See id. at 125.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 126.
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ceeding would be an impermissible collateral attack. Judgment for ad-
ministrative fees was rendered. The state's claims for a civil penalty and
the recovery of reasonable expenses were remanded because the state
had been denied the opportunity to present its case by the trial court's
take nothing judgment. 1 7
The court also held that the Commission was under no duty to accept
well equipment allegedly tendered by the directors as an offset against
the plugging costs, and because the Commission was under no duty to
accept, it could not be liable for negligence in failing to exercise control
over the equipment.118
117. See id. at 126-27.
118. See id. at 127-28.
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